Be he a fugitive or a whistle-blower, the former National Security Agency analyst Edward Snowden has generated a sizeable quantity of commentary and (one can predict) an enduring impact on the modern business of intelligence and the communication strategies of governments and non-state based adversaries alike. This paper makes two broad claims: 1) it argues that the Snowden's revelations about intrusive intelligence efforts by governments should not mark a fundamental divergence from our understanding of these activities prior to his disclosure of sensitive materials. However, in making these implied understandings public, Snowden and his media partners have changed the political dynamic around mass surveillance and dramatically scaled up public understanding of this area. 2)
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For the full text of this licence, please go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 2 establish public support. To provide coverage of these issues this paper is divided broadly into three sections: the first checks and challenges the continuity and change points around the NSA (and its allies) activities and the observable diplomatic aftermath; the second section explores the impact Snowden has had on the social contract, whilst the third and final section summarises where the enduring and transient legacies from this affair lie.
Business as usual in the dark corridors
The key argument of this section is that the behaviour that the Snowden information uncovered should be neither surprising nor unexpected. 4 Furthermore, it can be argued -with a high degree of certainty -that the response of a large number of European states to this information was nothing short of hypocritical, much as the pan-European response to rendition, or the kidnapping of terrorism suspects, was hypocritical some years ago. 5 As with rendition a large number of European states had been actively complicit in the PRISM program, taking participation far beyond mere acquiescence. But it is politically untenable for European governments to be relaxed about the NSA engaging in aggressive surveillance of political leaders, even if it was privately well known. The Americans were essentially 'outed', but from a European perspective thankfully by an American, much as they had been in the 1971 Pentagon Papers scandal, which bears similar characteristics. The repercussions for any non-US country if their citizen had been the source would have been severe and enduring. Evidence for this as a generalizable assertion comes from the removal of intelligence product from the UK following the Klaus Fuchs scandal concerning nuclear technologies 6 and the aftermath of the Cambridge Spy Ring, and the activities of Kim Philby, in particular 7 , and from the repercussions for French military intelligence of having provided targeting guidance in Belgrade that transpired to be the Chinese Embassy. 8 It simply does not pay to embarrass the world's pre-eminent intelligence nation.
A key element of the Snowden revelations has been to demonstrate the closely interconnected workings of the US via the NSA and friendly intelligence services abroad in closely controlling the development of mass surveillance techniques. Similarly it has been now shown that these nations (in particular Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and Sweden) have closely liaised to manoeuvre around the spirit of established laws, or the legislators' intentions for the law via intelligence liaison practice.
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That liaison mechanisms have been allowed to be used in this way has been overtly or tacitly been approved at government level, so it is for political parties to respond to the aggregated pressure from their electorates on this issue. Similarly, it had been thought that the so- Mandelbaum, 1999 9 Borger, 2013 10 The term 'minimize' in this context means the removal of records from the NSA archive. 11 Ball, 2013 So, whilst the NSA can still not explicitly target a British citizen without a warrant, it may do so if it collects the data 'incidentally', which means in the course an investigation into a warranted suspect or "It has been suggested GCHQ uses our partnership with the United States to get around UK law, obtaining information that they cannot legally obtain in the UK. I wish to be absolutely clear that this accusation is baseless. Any data obtained by us from the US involving UK nationals is subject to proper UK statutory controls and safeguards."
13
It is quite difficult to see how this statement tallies with the agreement that Snowden's leak suggests is in place between UK and US intelligence officials, even if only within the spirit of the words spoken.
Political Ownership
One aspect of the internal positioning of the agreements between the UK and US agencies is that is not clear is the extent to which British intelligence officials kept their political masters informed of the minutiae of this detailing or, as the British Foreign Minister said in answer to questions on this very topic that he and the Home Secretary make decisions on this area with the intelligence commissioners and thus it remains outside of wider government. 14 Such a stove-piping of information about issues that have such strong public interest and public policy resonance would seem alien in 12 It should be noted, however, that a 2005 NSA document ''Collection, Processing and Dissemination of Allied Communications', also noted that it should be possible for the US to spy on the citizens of the Five Eyes nations without the permission of those nations, and nor should they be notified that the activity was occurring. 13 Hague, 2013 14 Sparrow, 2013 almost any other area of government activity: the agenda to normalise the understanding of intelligence within bureaucratic frames of reference, typified by the work of Peter Gill is placed under serious tension by these more recent activities. 15 It also raises question-marks over the extent to which intelligence activity is even tangentially accountable to the citizenry, which will be addressed at greater length later in this essay.
The flow of information about the operational aspects of intelligence policy and a more general flow of information around intelligence communities is highly and deliberately constrained, not just in the UK but across European capitals. This is partly on the grounds of operational and information security, but mostly to provide the widest scope for intelligence officers and assets to operate unmolested by adversaries. It is therefore accurate to see intelligence as an exceptional area of diplomatic activity where oversight and political control are looser than one might find in almost every other area of government activity. 16 This works well in terms of having an efficient area of activity, but poorly when it comes to a divergence in government and public expectations. European publics (and their political masters for that matter) have been shocked and surprised to discover that oversight mechanisms can be observed to have been successful and effective, whilst simultaneously providing a backdrop to ubiquitous dragnet surveillance. 17 Thus it would be wrong to describe
Parliamentary oversight as having failed, but that systems of oversight had been given underspecified powers, particularly in those nations with highly developed capabilities. As such a public discourse has emerged where both intelligence and the political oversight of intelligence has become separated or disconnected from the publics these agencies serve. For the future efficacy of intelligence activity, it is important that this disconnect is quickly bridged, by improved legal powers to question and secure evidence and by publishing reports that can be quickly understood by the public in direct form (e.g. from Parliamentary web-sources) or via media filters.
15 Gill, 1994 16 Bochel, Defty, & Kirkpatrick, 2013 17 Medick & Meiritz, 2013 
Diplomatic Antecedents and Impacts
The focus of attention upon the two leading countries of the 'Five Eyes' Group, the UK and US has also allowed capable states, such as France, Germany and Spain to complain that these activities have been done to them, rather than them being involved in this range of activities, and indeed shaping the political and legal landscape to further the reach of these activities. So, for example, in late 2013
France, Germany and Spain have all summoned their respective US ambassadors to discuss surveillance within their borders, whilst in November 2013 the UK ambassador to Germany was invited to discuss alleged eavesdropping from the UK embassy in Berlin, an operation which -on the face of it -did not look to be particularly sophisticated. 18 It is possible to observe a strong resonance between the European reaction to PRISM and associated programmes and their reaction to the breaking stories around the US policy of so-called 'rendition' (or extra-judicial kidnapping) after
2003.
European states keenly reacted to rendition with horror that a shadow system of prisons and extrajudicial activity could be in place and active. But it then became clear, in a way that never received a similar level of public exposure, that these same European states -and 11 were cited by the European Parliament -were at least knowledgably complicit in rendition, and some had been actively Chancellor Merkel is thinking, I will call Chancellor Merkel.", which seemed to imply -by the time the news broke in October -that either he was not telling the truth, or that he was unaware that this surveillance was going on. 24 Mrs Merkel let it be known that she viewed this activity as 'a grave breach of trust', and opinion polls both indicated that German public confidence in the US as ally had dropped (down some 14% in three months) and that 92% of Germans were in favour of a 'no-spy' treaty as a result. 25 But it was not just from the German government that the Americans received suggesting a large amount of activity, similarly the American Ambassador was called in to account for this level of surveillance.
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Of particularly concern to the French authorities was that the surveillance net had been cast far wider than those suspected of terrorist offences of seeking to injure American interests: collection was also targeted at the French political and business communities: a strong resonance of the pattern of behaviour around ECHELON. 22 Casciani, 2012 23 Lane, 2013 24 Obama, 2013 25 Welle, 2013 26 Follorou & Greenwald, 2013 So, the key question that emerges from this is the degree to which real disruption to diplomatic flows has occurred. It is difficult to measure this in a concretely scientific way, particularly so close to the events unfolding. It is possible to judge that there is a degree of positioning and hypocrisy to the condemnations: both France and Germany in particular have fully functioning espionage activities, and the French are considered to be the most active of the western nations in espionage in the US itself. So, strong condemnations are partly for the purposes of counter-espionage: an attempt to disrupt US activity. Similarly the condemnation may serve another purpose, so in the case of France, President Hollande implied a threat against the comprehensive trade agreement being negotiated between the EU and US (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), so part of this positioning can be seen as an attempt to reduce the negotiating power of the US. Surveillance done against the European institutions will almost inevitably feature on how they approach these negotiations too, and the European Commission has stated that it wishes to reopen negotiations on data-sharing with the US and to insert 'anti-snooping measures' into the TTIP, whilst European
Parliamentarians called for a suspension of financial data sharing with the US in retaliation. 27 So across Europe, the reactions to the Snowden revelations are in line with general dispositions towards the US, save for Germany who responded with greater anger than could have been predicted in July 2013.
Comforting the Enemy?
A strong part of the official discourse surrounding the Snowden leaks was that they firstly gave 'comfort to the enemy', and it was on this basis that the some in the US wanted Snowden extradited back to the US, and secondly, that the revelations around US tactics and capabilities would give current and future belligerents a competitive advantage. 28 Of all the things said about these leaks, these are the least persuasive. Those involved in serious activities against western interests would already be acutely aware about the insecurity of electronic communications and data trails, this is why
Jihadists at various stages in during the 2000s switched to small, cellular structures, away from telecommunications, to voice-over-internet-protocol communications, to 'burner phones', and satellite phones, from electronic money transfers and bank-holdings to cash-passed-on in person and in the case of bin Laden to accommodation with high walls, and cloth drapes for outside shade to evade overhead surveillance -no longer out in the wilderness but conspicuously in the suburbs, just away from the prying overhead eye. So, those engaged in these activities in a serious way would already have been avoiding (as far as they could) the techniques being deployed by the US and allies. Those self-radicalising or partaking in less well planned activities might have gained some kind of additional wisdom, but the actual risk or threat posed by these actors is difficult to assess and is likely to be small.
The invocation of 'giving comfort to the enemy' is geared more towards its public relations impact:
the positioning of Snowden as a whistle-blower and to some a heroic sacrificial figure was addressed -in part-by seeking to appeal to patriotic sentiment: 'comfort to the enemy' is constructing Snowden as them, helping them, against the interests of us. That the them might be better equipped to strike us The main argument of this section is that the activities of the large and capable intelligence organisations in the developed world, and particularly the NSA and GCHQ, have had the impact of perturbing the diplomatic system in the short-term, but that for the ordinary public these revelations have the capacity to drive a larger wedge between the governmental elites and the populous.
In his interview evidence to The Guardian newspaper Edward Snowden said the following (and this provides the principle driver for his actions in leaking the material):
'Even if you're not doing anything wrong you're being watched and recorded… The storage capability of these systems increases every year consistently by orders of magnitude to where it's getting to the point -you don't have to have done anything wrong. You simply have to eventually fall under suspicion from somebody, even by a wrong call. And then they can use this system to go back in time and scrutinize every decision you've ever made, every friend you've ever discussed something with. And attack you on that basis to sort of derive suspicion from an innocent life paint anyone in the context of a wrongdoer '. 31 This is the logic of the panoptican and within popular political discourse it is the logic of totalitarian states that the democratic world are said to oppose. It is within this central irony of democratic states adopting the tools and methods of autocracy to protect freedom that the core political problem appears, and within two main modes of transmission: 1) a simple political divergence that is based on a failure of expectations e.g. we thought that the core values of these services were x, and they appear to be y, and 2) a psychological process that is akin to criminalisation, by which I mean that observable process by which individuals become desensitised to certain types of criminal activity. The most obvious 'benign' examples are paying for services in cash to avoid taxation, or downloading music from peer-to-peer websites, or being fined for automotive speeding. The ubiquity of these activities gradually places the individual outside of the frame of certain laws -which have uneven patterns of enforcement -and eventually blurs the line between those who are law-abiding and those who hold a 'pragmatic' view of the sanctity of the law. 32 A similar phenomenon can be seen to be emerging with 31 Snowden, 2013 32 Corbett & Grayson, 2010 reference to intelligence agencies. Part of the observation is analogous, and is captured by communities using alternative internet services -those using 'Tor' (an online anonymity service established in 2002, that was partly funded by US government monies in its initial phase) -which allows users to evade the normal surveillance over their internet activities. 33 Typical users are those in sensitive professions (journalists, military personnel and business people) as well as those which an NSA official recently called 'very naughty', by which he meant a criminal element. 34 The debate in the UK around Tor and services using the Tor architecture has focussed in on the 'naughty' elements of it, as an alleged permissive environment for child pornographers, drug smugglers and others intent on criminal activity. 35 The shaping of political discourse around Tor that if there is not unfettered access for security officials to it that 'bad things will happen' misses out on the reality that criminals are good at adopting multiple, fluid identities with or without Tor, and that the Tor services are used by legitimate users seeking internet anonymity, up to and including dissidents in developing world countries whom America and their European allies support. The official response to Tor is informative though: it is an ungovernable cyber-space generating a large amount of anxiety in security and political circles (and we learn particularly the NSA), resulting in a strong dominant discourse around deviance. 36 If one was to poll those who had read media coverage of the Tor service, one would assume that it was essentially criminal in character. This is a clear attempt to shape politics, and to curtail certain kinds of lawful activities and speech-acts, but it should be noted that those using Tor and related services have rapidly increased since July 2013 suggesting there is a strong demand for these kind of services currently.
The One Percent Doctrine and Electoral Disillusionment
The attempts to unveil the identities of Tor users, and to survey their activities also points to a continuation of the famous 1% doctrine (also known as the Cheney Doctrine), whereby government 33 Soghoian, 2012 34 Dredge, 2013 35 Smith, 2013 36 Schnier, 2013 action was deemed justified if there was just a 1% chance of a threat being realised: the emphasis was on the response rather than the threat. 37 The impact on the public of the 1% doctrine, or variations of it, is that rather than being protected by government agencies, the public are the object of their attentions and that shift in emphasis is crucial in understanding a recasting a the social contract between state and citizenry. In a British context this is simply expressed in using an imperial and postimperial frame of reference: we are happy that security measures are taken against them, in order to protect us. But if we run the same basic sentence and premise under what we know post-Snowden it becomes 'security measures are taken against us and them, in order to protect us from them. The astute reader will see that the definitional clarity of the first sentence (even if socially constructed) is lost in the second sentence where the distinction between us and them is entirely merged. There is thus the potential for an uneasy, or unintentionally aligned coalition of us and them to emerge which sees security and intelligence efforts in an adversarial guise. Such a coalition, if allowed to persist, would put the fundamental social contract of the public offering up their unfettered freedom of action for a security guarantee from the state under question.
The creation of an adversarial relationship to emerge between intelligence agencies and the citizenry are not emerging in a vacuum, however, it is more worryingly replicated in the drift away from mainstream political processes and towards the politics of protest and radicalism. Classically, this was typified by a soft-correlation between the reduction in popular participation in political parties, and election turnout and an increase in participation in interest groups. 38 More recently, and particularly since the economic crisis of 2007-8 this has dovetailed with the emergence of consistent opinion poll data suggesting a disillusionment with the political establishment as a class or activity, in line with corporate financiers as being part of a coupled elite. 39 Put more simply, there is growing trend to think that these elites are 'nothing to do with us', and 'do not work in our interests'. There are many possible responses governments could take to this, including out-reach efforts and efforts in 37 Suskind, 2006 38 Richardson, 1995 39 Flinders & Kelso, 2011 transparency. The most productive route for governments will be mild reform, including more overt and publicised oversight mechanisms and an elongated period of time without adverse publicity. "One intelligence collection system alone can generate a million inputs per half hour; filters throw away all but 6500 inputs; only 1,000 inputs meet forwarding criteria; 10 inputs are normally selected by analysts and only one report is produced. These are routine statistics for a number of intelligence collection and analysis systems which collect technical intelligence".
An unchallenged past? Echoes of ECHELON
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In a direct echo to the Snowden papers and PRISM the defence of ECHELON was that it did not intercept a particular target's communications, more that if focussed on target phrases and patterns and thus individuals were identified as a by-product of those sifts. The defence of PRISM is that it collects meta-data, from which targets may be selected for closer attention or that the meta-data is sifted once a target has been identified. ECHELON did not attract the public attention that Snowden 40 Campbell, They've got it taped -Somebody's listening, 1988 41 Webb, 2008 42 Studeman, 1992 and PRISM has. This may be -in part -to the reliance at the time on print, radio and non-24 hour rolling news outputs for dissemination of such messages. An analogue era compared to the ubiquity of social media and internet delivered news content today, but a more likely explanation is likely to be the successful rebuttal of the notion of that ECHELON targeted the ordinary citizen on a wide-scale.
The most active organisation in Europe on the question and danger of ECHELON was the European Parliament, who were particularly concerned about the potential advantages American trading interests were gaining via intercepts of the positioning, commercial manoeuvres and negotiations of European business interests. European Parliamentarians returned home from a fact-finding mission to the US early in 1999 when American government officials maintained the official line that ECHELON did not exist, and two of the stronger research papers on ECHELON were commissioned by the European Parliament and were written by Duncan Campbell, who had originally broken the story, and Dick Holdsworth who was the first to point out the economic espionage possibilities from NSA stations in Europe. 43 The marginalised position of the European Parliament, prior to the Lisbon reforms, was a hindrance to the widening of opposition to invasive surveillance techniques and practices at the time, and may have contributed to a sense amongst American security officials that there was little in the way of significant opposition to them expanding these activities. It should also be remembered that the Europeanisation of security and defence (whilst by no means fully developed now) was almost totally absent in 1999 and 2000, and so was a competency that was vested in Member Governments, some of whom were involved in the delivery of ECHELON, whilst others were passive landlords to collecting stations: there was little appetite at a state level to generate adverse commentary about this programme. There has been a great deal made by European governments about the NSA programmes, notable targets, and in particular where they have targeted European citizens. That this activity was happening would not have been a surprise to European governments, particularly as a good number of them were complicit in the American programme or peripheral European variants. And so the positioning here is in part political necessity, it simply is not possible for a government to say that it is relaxed about a third party engaging in widespread surveillance of its citizens. For those governments not directly 44 Hennessy, 1996 & Dover & Goodman, 2009 45 Echoing the title of another Peter Hennessy title (2013) 46 Aldrich, 2011 involved in the programmes it is a permissive and appropriate moment for them to voice their concerns or opposition to the activities taking place. And for those governments involved it was an opportunity for them to try and show points of difference and to highlight American activity with the aim of shielding their own well developed programmes from the glare of attention. The complaints from the EU institutions about intrusive surveillance into their operations seem genuinely felt however, and there is likely to be changes operating procedure here to try and bolster cyber-security.
The bugging of German Chancellor Merkel's phone caused genuine anger and revulsion in Germany.
The official American line that President Obama was unaware of this activity against one of his most important European allies gave the impression that either the NSA had gone rogue or the President had not been informed of this highly sensitive activity: either option is as unpalatable as the other. The exceptionalism of the activities against Merkel only lie in the fact that she was such a close ally and diplomatic partner of Obama's, the interception of political leaders' communications is routine, and - Congress. 48 Such reforms do, therefore, seem highly unlikely to be radical, and thus those international partners affected by NSA activities will need to respond to these activities as they see fit.
Building upon President Obama's embarrassment regarding Chancellor Merkel, the Snowden episode has brought into stark relief the reality that the technical capacity and capabilities of developed world intelligence agencies have outpaced the legal frameworks within which they operate and the political oversight mechanisms that are meant to unsure appropriate tasking and political accountability. One important aspect of the official shaping of the consequences of the Snowden revelation concerned the advantage that had been given to adversaries, who were now able to shape their communications strategies to avoid the attentions of the NSA and associated allies. 51 Given the multifaceted relationship between the allied security forces (be they military or intelligence) and various Iraqi, Afghan and jihadist adversaries where each side has adapted to the others developments, approaches and tactics it seems unlikely in the extreme that all bar the least sophisticated of belligerent actors would have viewed electronic communications as being a safe means by which to communicate prior to the Snowden material. To suggest that Snowden has radically altered the operating basis for terrorist groups would seem to be disingenuous.
An enduring impact of this Snowden imbroglio might well become the design and architecture of the internet itself: a move which would be opportunistic rather than one of necessity. US design and control over the fundamental architecture of the internet (naming and address location) has been a live issue for the last five years at least. Knowledge that the NSA and allies have been tapping into the core infrastructure to intercept traffic in transit has produced considerable quantities of analysis around whether an alternative architectural design is desirable: such a move, instigated by Chinese or 49 Oakshott & Kerbaj, 2013 50 Sparrow, 2013 51 Slack, 2013 Russian authorities would significantly raise the transaction costs for US in collecting this material.
Whilst naming and addressing is one element of the infrastructure of the internet, physical cabling is the other, and in response to allegations that the NSA has inserted physical intercepts into the submarine cables a number of states have suggested that they will invest in their own cabling to protect their communications. The most credible of these come from Brazil and Germany. In February 2014, and in the light of a reported decision to abandon attempts at a 'no-spy' deal with the US, Chancellor Merkel suggested that she would seek support for a European communications network, so that electronic traffic no longer needed to transit through American servers (Deutsche Telekom has proposed its own similar system too). In reality this piece of populism will only be opposed by the most Atlanticist of nations in Europe. 52 In security terms, it now makes clear sense for European governments to be more pro-active in securing communications data, but it is more of a question of how this is achieved, with some -including Edward Snowden in subsequent interviews -arguing that it can only be done so by international agreement. 53 Some of this international brokerage has been done within the UN, which pre-Snowden had been focussing on the alleged Chinese government theft of developed world intellectual property, and which the United States was keen to remain the focus post-Snowden too. The resolutions made at the end of 2013 within the UN General Assembly were passed without the need for a vote and sought to reaffirm principles of individual privacy and international agreement, so there may be avenues here that can be exploited by governments.
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In its response to the revelations about the extent of NSA surveillance on Brazilian communications, the Brazilian government has proposed in draft form a requirement for all Brazilian data to be held in Brazil, advanced quantum cryptography and its own submarine data cabling. 55 Critics have described these moves as the Balkanization of the internet, and unless the Brazilian government subsidises datawarehousing within its borders, these measures will add a significant market barrier to technology companies and e-commerce in Brazil. Additionally, a substantial and underplayed aspect of this whole 52 Financial Times, Berlin must not erect a data wall, 17 February 2014. 53 Bryant, 2014 54 UN, 2013 55 Leahy, 2013 issue is the considerable market share in network devices designed and manufactured in China, with several of the 'Five Eyes' nations banning the installation of Chinese made devices for fear of deliberately designed flaws to allow vulnerabilities to be exploited by Chinese intelligence operatives. 56 Similarly, the existing internet architecture is said to be vulnerable to wholesale Chinese interception: the NSA scandal may just be the one we have learned about. 57 Former US Secretary of War Henry Stimson once famously said, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail". The Cold War taught us to focus in on confronting threats that emanated from within and without. Post-9/11, these Cold War techniques, coupled from the threat from Jihadism have crystallised to remove the governmental taboos around individual privacy. As a consequence this has become no era for gentlemen.
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